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OUR "SACRED" CONSTITUTION - ANOTHER VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION AS LITERARY TEXT
MICHAEL LES BENEDICT*

Professor Ferguson reminds us that, unlike the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution posited no self-evident truths. He
states that between 1776 and 1787 the framers of the Constitution
had learned that truth itself was indeterminate.' He compares
Franklin's comments on signing the Declaration to his comments
on the completion of the Constitution,2 and he also cites Madison's
acknowledgment in The Federalist No. 37 of the difficulty with
3
which the delegates at the convention arrived at consensus. Pro-

fessor Ferguson is surely right that Madison, and perhaps Franklin, understood that people's perception of truth was influenced by
so many factors that no one could be certain that his or her conclusion was correct beyond a doubt.4 Like Jefferson, Madison had arrived at that perception well before 1787. It lay at the heart of
their arguments for religious freedom in Virginia. Madison articulated it in his petitions against the religious establishment there,"
and Jefferson offered a classic statement of it in his Notes on the
State of Virginia.'
However, it is not at all clear that all or most other framers
shared Madison's perspective. The whole concept of the evil of faction that pervaded eighteenth-century American thought was
based on the notion that there was a public good that could be
identified by virtuous people and that disagreement implied faction-that is, the willingness of a particular group to place its in* Professor of History, The Ohio State University. B.A., University of Illinois, 1965; M.A.,
University of Illinois, 1967; Ph.D., Rice University, 1976.
1. Ferguson, "We Do Ordain and Establish".The ConstitutionAs Literary Text, 29 Wrv.
& MARY L. REV. 3, 4 (1987).
2. Id. at 5-7.
3. Id. at 6-7.
4. Id. at 4-5.
5. 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901) (hereinafter MADISON).
6. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 157-61 (W. Peden ed. 1954) (1st ed.
1787).
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terests ahead of those of the whole. That notion certainly had not
disappeared by 1787. George Washington offered one of the classic
statements of it in his Farewell Address of 1797, in language authored largely by another framer, Alexander Hamilton. The fact
is, American opinion about how one arrived at political, religious,
and (implicitly) other truths was in flux in the 1780s. It may be
that some of the framers were consciously trying to impose order
on what they knew was a disorderly reality, but I think one would
be hard pressed to demonstrate that this was a dominant
perception.'
Professor Ferguson states that given their recognition of the indeterminacy of truth, the framers understood that they had to
"impose" truth-that the Constitution was a "manipulated and
manipulative work,. . . the imposed truth of a conscious and philosophically sophisticated elite." It is not clear what Professor Ferguson means by using the terms "manipulate" and "impose" here.
Does he simply mean that because truth is not "self-evident," men
must struggle as best they can to discover it by reason and then
articulate it through language? If so, well and good. Or does he
mean something else-that there is no identifiable truth and that
therefore all truth is the artificial creation of investigators who
must then convince others of it by the manipulation of language?
In terms of the Constitution, does he mean that a sophisticated
elite, by manipulation of language, imposed its view of truth on a
naive public? The implications of this interpretation of Professor

7. 1 A

COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,

1789-1797, at 213

(W. Richardson ed. 1896).
8. For discussions of post-revolutionary American political ideas suggesting that Americans believed virtuous people could arrive at correct answers to public questions if not seduced into faction, see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 5370, 393-429 passim (1969), and R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF
LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1969). The fact that the Federalists made truth a defense to the charge of seditious libel in the Sedition Act of 1798 but
plainly intended it to apply to matters of opinion indicates that many of the framers still
believed that truth could be distinguished from error with confidence. Insisting that they
wished only to suppress malicious falsehoods, they clearly did not accept Madison's view
that "the truth of an opinion is not susceptible of proof." 6 MADISON, supra note 5, at 337.
See J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 81-85 passim (1951); J.
SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

122-25, 144-46 passim (1956).
9. Ferguson, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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Ferguson's position are serious and ought not to receive unthinking
assent. All Professor Ferguson seems to be describing is what for
several thousand years western civilization has called rhetoric-the
art of persuasion by force of expression. Persuasion, of course, is a
legitimate element of political life. If the framers persuaded Americans to ratify the Constitution in part through the compelling
craft of their language, few would feel that effort illegitimate. "Manipulation" and "imposition," on the other hand, do not impart
the legitimacy of "persuasion." To suggest that the Constitution
was "imposed" through "manipulation" undermines the legitimacy
of its adoption and certainly of its sanction as an expression of the
public will.
Through their craft as writers, Professor Ferguson says, the
framers were able to establish a sanction for the system devised by
the Constitution, despite the indeterminacy of truth.'0 They were
conscious of that craft, he insists-not only that building a government required craft, but that the presentation of it was a matter of
craft."" Note the difference. Professor Ferguson cites Adams as
"comparing 'the art of lawgiving' to architecture and painting."' 2
Now what was Adams saying here? Was he referring to the language of lawgiving or to the nature of the laws themselves? In the
instance of establishing government, was he referring to the manner in which its constitution would be presented, or to the structure of the government it created-the necessity for balance, for
making sure conception comported with reality in the same way
that an architect must make sure that the conception of a structure will bear the stresses imposed in the real world?
As evidence that Adams was referring to the manner in which
the Constitution was presented, rather than to its substance, Professor Ferguson quotes him as saying that in the future, "'the
fabrication of constitutions will be the occupation or the sport, the
tragedy, comedy, or farce, for the entertainment of the world.'
He argues that this shows Adams' concern with the aesthetics of
constitution-framing, the art of couching the document in language

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 10-12.
at 10-12, 22-24.
at 14 (quoting 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 398 (C. Adams ed. 1851)).
(quoting 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 397 (C. Adams ed. 1851)).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:27

that would promote acceptance and obedience.' 4 But the language
does not compel that conclusion. Rather, Adams was saying that
American efforts to create governments were so remarkable that
they were bound to be chronicled in the future. They might be
studied ("the occupation") or they might be "the sport . . . of the
world," tragedy or farce, depending on how successfully the revolutionary generation completed the task.
Professor Ferguson states that in The Federalist No. 37,
Madison articulated the indeterminacy of truth, in effect conceding that agreements on solutions to problems were contrived rather
than discovered.' 5 Madison therefore turned to craft to win support for the Constitution. He stressed the fact of consensus among
the framers to provide a sanction for the Constitution, artfully
drawing on a myth of the saints.' 6 Professor Ferguson is correct
that Madison conceded the indeterminacy of truth in The Federalist No. 37. Madison did seem to indicate that the fact of consensus
among the framers ought to count for something and that a pious
observer-Madison did not say he was such an observer-must
perceive the hand of the Almighty in the achievement of consensus
on such intractable questions. But I do not think that one can
cite The Federalist No. 37 as demonstrating that the framers
turned to a myth of consensus among the saints to sanction the
Constitution. 8 Madison's point was not that his readers should defer to the framer-saints, but that they should not adhere to their
own views so stubbornly as to dismiss the proposed Constitution
simply because it did not correspond in all ways with their own
personal ideal. Rather, he urged them to remember that the Constitution had to come as close as possible to the ideals of all those
who had framed it and would ratify it. He was reminding his readers that they were part of a community. He was urging open-mindedness, not deference. So considered, The FederalistNo. 37 was of
a piece with the central thrust of Madison's and Jefferson's political creed-toleration of opinion in religion and politics. In a sense,
Madison invited his readers to imagine themselves in the place of
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 21-23.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 103 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981)).
See id. at 24-25.
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the framers; in a sense, he invited them to participate in the
framing.
Professor Ferguson argues that the framers worked to sanctify
the Constitution, to harness religious imagery to make it an object
of veneration.19 He states that the framers projected the miracle of
consensus as the "unanimity of the saints" and thus made the
Constitution a sacred text. 20 But nowhere do the framers refer to
themselves as saints. Professor Ferguson himself authors this metaphor, citing Madison's attribution of consensus to the finger of
God.21 But Madison's religious metaphor is one of the very few one
can find before ratification. The only other allusion to God I know
of in the Federalist papers is Jay's statement in The Federalist
No. 2 that (a very impersonal) "Providence" had been pleased to
create an environment conducive to liberty in America.22 There are
very few allusions to God in Elliot's Debates in the state ratifying
conventions-insignificant compared to the attention to other
sources of authority, such as history, theory of government, and
British constitutional thought.23 After ratification, however, when
Madison and other nascent Republicans charged Federalists with
violating constitutional limitations, they urged Americans to venerate the Constitution-to hold its articulation of the boundaries between power and liberty sacred. Professor Ferguson's quotations of
Madison's religious imagery are from 1792, when Madison began
organizing opposition to Federalism, criticizing Federalist policy
for violating constitutional limitations.2 In doing so he was drawing not on an American religious heritage, however, but on the
traditional libertarian rhetoric of the eighteenth-century British
world, as common in England as in America.2 5 The purpose was
not to sanctify an artificial imposition of order on a disorderly
world, but to establish some sanction for constitutional limitations
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 21-22.
21. Id. at 8 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 103 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed.
1981)).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 9 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1971).
23. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
24. 6 MADISON, supra note 5, at 85.
25. J. Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Era of the American Revolution (unpublished
manuscript).
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in an era that did not yet perceive the courts to be the force policing the Constitution's boundaries. Indeed, popular commitment to
constitutionalism is the single most important sanction for constitutional limitations, and one can argue that continued efforts to
sanctify the Constitution are designed to inculcate that commitment rather than merely to iconize the document.2"
Finally, Professor Ferguson argues that in referring to themselves as framers, the authors of the Constitution again worked to
convey a sense of order, of boundaries around a finished work, as a
frame around a picture. Although Professor Ferguson does not
himself accept what scholars are now calling originalism-the idea
that not only must constitutional law be derived from the text of
the document itself, but the text must be interpreted in accordance with contemporary definitions 2 8 -his stress on its finished,
enclosed, limited nature supports that narrow construction.
I think, however, that Professor Ferguson mistakes the metaphor
inherent in the word "frame." Besides defining frame as "an established order, plan, scheme, system, esp. of government," the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "a structure which serves as
an underlying support or skeleton," or a structure "of which the
parts form an outline or skeleton not filled in."' 29 That is, frame is
used in the sense of a framework. It seems to me that when they
referred to themselves as framers, Madison and the others were
thinking of the Constitution as a frame of government in this
sense. Of course, the difference in the metaphors is significant. A

26. While urging the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Madison pointed out to Jefferson the
salutary effect on citizens' attitudes of declaring fundamental liberties in a written Constitution. So declared, he stated, they "acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims
of free government. . . . [Tihey become incorporated with the national sentiment, [and]
counteract the impulses of interest and passion." 6 MADISON, supra note 5, at 273. The
importance of the Constitution as a symbol has been recognized by legal scholars, even as
they lamented uncritical worship. See especially Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937), and Mason, The Supreme Court: Temple and Forum, 48
YALE L.J. 524 (1959). For a more positive assessment, see C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRAcY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 169-72 (1950).
27. Ferguson, supra note 1, at 11-12.
28. See Berger, "Original Intention" in HistoricalPerspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986); Bork, OriginalIntent and the Constitution,7 HUMANITIES 22 (1986); Meese, Toward
Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 2 BENCHMARK 1 (1986); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV 353 (1981).

29. 4

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

507 (1961).
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picture frame is, as Professor Ferguson points out, enclosing and
limiting, setting a boundary to a finished canvas.3 0 A framework is
a skeleton, an outline, a structure that establishes the direction for
further articulation, at the same time conveying a sense of incompleteness, an invitation to amplify.
The original strength of the opposition to the Constitution developed precisely because the Antifederalists considered the proposal a finished statement. As such, it was hopelessly flawed in the
structure it established-especially so because it lacked a Bill of
Rights. It was the stress that the Constitution's proponents placed
on its openness to amendment that finally saved the day, securing
ratification in the crucial states of Massachusetts, Virginia, and
New York.3 1 At the time they made the concession, the Federalists
do not seem to have considered the proposed amendments an addition to a closed document. On the contrary, Madison originally
proposed to incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights in the body
32
of the Constitution.
The incompleteness of the Constitution is plain from the document itself. Its remarkable conciseness, to which Professor Ferguson has alluded, is largely the result of the framers' decision to
describe Congress most completely and then to invite it to develop
further the structure of the rest of the government. Thus they authorized Congress to decide how to deal with an inability of both
the President and Vice President to serve. They referred to executive departments but left it to Congress to establish them, define
their responsibilities, and shape their bureaucracies. They placed
judicial power in a Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."3 3 They
even left it to Congress to decide the composition of the Supreme
Court and regulate its jurisdiction. A comparision of the United
States Constitution with that of almost any state in the Union indicates how much the framers left undone.
The Constitution is a sketch, not a painting. What is perhaps
most remarkable about the men who limned that sketch is that
30. Ferguson, supra note 1, at 11.

31. See R. RUTLAND, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 105-59 (1977); B. SCHWARTZ, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 126-89 (1955).
32. R. RUTLAND, supra note 31, at 167; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 31, at 199, 207-08.
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

34
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having done so, they turned the palette over to the people of the
United States. They beckoned us to join them, just as Madison
invited his readers to participate vicariously in the framing. When
it comes to the painting that represents the reconciliation of government and liberty, we are all to be the artists.

